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I.
1. The system of international trade is usually taken as a set
of rules which has remained practically fixed since the first
years following the second World War. It is considered as the
legal framework which greatly facilitated the international
exchange of goods and services during the last 25 years. Changes -
like the conclusion or termination of agreements between states
or the putting in and out of operation of national laws and regu-
lations - normally left the system intact because they occurred
within the framework of these rules. If they collided with them
they were either regarded as temporary deviations or as concessions
(exceptions) which were unavoidable, mostly for political reasons.
It is, however, doubtful if this conception is still correct,
since the "deviations" and "exception" have now reached dimen-
sions which can no longer be called negligible. Moreover, these
"deviations" and "exceptions" are scarcely temporary at all.
This ca\i be demonstrated with regard to the three basic principles
of the system of international trade: Reciprocity, Most-favoured
nation treatment and Liberalization.
2. The principle of reciprocity came first under attack when,
during the early sixties, the development of the economically
See my essay, "The System of International Trade in Transition",
"Economics", Vol.4, page 50 et seq., published in German in
"Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv", Vol.105, page 334 et seq. with
the title "Entwicklungstendenzen der internationalen Handels-
ordnung."- 2 -
underdeveloped nations became an urgent necessity. As far as
these nations were concerned, it became doubtful if it were
justified to ask them for concessions, in the name of the prin-
ciple of reciprocity, if and when the industrialized countries
lowered trade barriers. In the end, the contracting parties of
the General Agreement on Tariffs arid Trade (GATT) recognized that
the developing countries as a whole were entitled to some sort of
infant-nations-protection, a parallel to infant-industries-pro-
tection. A new Section IV became part of the GATT in I966, in
which the industrialized nations declared that, if they took
measures to liberalize trade, they no longer expected equivalent
2
concessions from the developing countries.
3. Apart from this development, the value of reciprocity became
even more generally doubted when the negotiations of the Kennedy-
Round started. In former tariff rounds concessions were negotiated
item by item on the basis of reciprocity. A lowering of customs
duties for one good by one country was traded against a lowering
of duties by another country for another product. In order to
make the concessions of both sides comparable, a crude method of
quantification was applied, where the value of previous imports
was multiplied with the percentage points of the tariff reductions.
d
Such a calculation, of course, left out of consideration essen-
tials like the elasticities of supply and demand, and this defect
may have been one reason why, during the Kennedy-Round, a totally
new approach was tried, that of linear across-the-board reductions
of tariffs. Another reason for this procedure was certainly the
desire to reach substantial reductions, since such reductions had
been difficult to attain by the method of trading reciprocal con-
cessions item against item.
A decision of the contracting parties to this effect was signed
on February 8(th, 1965, and came into force on June 27th, 1966.
2
Art.XXXVI, para.8 GATT: "The developed contracting parties do
not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade
negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to
the trade of less-developed contracting parties."- 3 -
4. Admittedly, the intended global across-the-board approach
was heavily watered down during the actual negotiations. Never-
theless, this deviation from item by item reciprocity has contri-
2
buted considerably to the undeniable success of the Kennedy-Round.
This approach of only "global" reciprocity will again be tried in
the next tariff round which is scheduled to start in 1973* There -
fore, it can be concluded that the principle of reciprocity has
either lost importance, or will only continue to play some role
in future international trade negotiations in a modified form.
With regard to less developed countries, it has probably been
given up definitely.
II.
5. The principle of most-favoured nation treatment was also
questioned. During the discussions following the first United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it was
argued that equal treatment could only be applied to comparable
3
cases. If, however, the cases differed greatly, treatment had to
be adjusted. This meant that most-favoured nation treatment only
implied equal treatment in the case of industrialized nations
using it on imports from other industrialized nations. Since
developing countries, however, were economically in an underpri-
vileged position, they were entitled to better treatment. Better
of customs duties which was raised by the EEC Commission.
2
Although the initial goal of a 50 per cent tariff reduction was
not reached, the actual reduction of approximately 30 P
e
r cent
compared favourably with the result of previous "rounds".
•* UNCTAD, Document TD/B/AC.1/1 (23rd March I965): Preferences:
Review of Discussions. Report by the Secretary-General of the
Conference. Prior to the Conference, customs preferences were
dealt with in the so-called Prebish Report. UN-Document
E/Conf. h6/y ^(l2th February 1964): Towards a new trade policy
for development. Report by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.treatment, in this case, meant preferences, and - since the
argument was put forward in connection with customs duties - it
meant customs preferences.
6. After seven years of negotiations, this view prevailed, and
now several industrialized western countries give trade preferen-
ces in favour of most LDC's. Among the first trading units to in-
troduce such preferences was the EEC. In fact, only Australia
did so earlier than the Community, and only for a rather small
range of goods, favouring a limited group of less developed
3
2
countries. The EEC list, in contrast, includes all tariff
headings under chapters 25 - 99 of the Brussels Nomenclature'
and many of chapters 1 - 2k. The preferences were given to al-
most all developing nations.
7. To be sure, the Community's preferences by no means fulfill
all the demands which the LDC's organisation, the so-called Group
of 77 > had formulated: Unlimited non-reciprocal abolition of
all customs duties by all industrialized countries in favour of
all less developed countries. In contrast to these demands, pre-
1 On 1st July 1971 cf.Regulation of the EEC Nos.1308/71 to 1314/71i
Official Gazette of the EEC, No.L 142, pp.1,13,57,63,69,75 and
2 fi s
See the GATT (Art.XXV) "waiver", under which Australia was per-
mitted to give preferential rates to imports of certain goods
from less developed countries. GATT, Basic Instruments, l4th
Supp. (1966) p.23.
3
I.e. all goods with the exception of agricultural products.
k
The most significant exceptions were Turkey, Spain, Greece,
Cuba, Israel, Taiwan, Bulgaria and Rumania.
This group of developing nations was organised during the first
UN conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in the Spring
of 1964 with the aim of giving the LDC's demands more weight
by confronting the industrialized countries with a compact
group speaking with one voice.
It should be noted that the establishment of the Group of 77
as an organisation of the less developed countries is a new
feature of the international trade scene. The emergence of this
group brought into focus the existence of an organisation of the
industrialized western nations, namely the OECD. The GATT, to-
gether with the organs and some specialized agencies of the
United Nations with the increasing membership of LDC's ceased to
to represent primarily the interests of the industrialized
countries. The interests of the developing countries now pre-
vail, for the simple reason that they are represented in these
organisations by a greater number of states.- 5 -
ferences are not given by all industrialized countries. This evi-
dently, is not the fault of the Community. The EEC is, however,
responsible for the following limitations:
- Preferential treatment is not extended to all goods. Agri-
cultual products and many processed agricultural goods are
excluded.
- Customs duties are not abolished. They are suspended for most
industrial goods. For processed agricultural goods, however,
they are merely lowered.
- Preferential treatment is not unlimited. It is generally
2
limited in time. horeover, for a substantial group of goods,
3
imports at preferential rates are also limited in volume. If
and when imports exceedihis volume fixed in advance, the origi-
nal duties are levied again.
k
- The EEC does not extend preferences to all developing countries.
In some cases, countries are excluded for political reasons
(Cuba, Israel), in others (Turkey, Greece, Spain), there seems
to have been hesitation to rank European countries as less de-
veloped. *
Here, preferences are only given on the value added - usually
rather small - added by the processing (packing) industry, not on
the imports of agricultural products, which are excluded from
the preferential treatment.
2
First, preferences were given from July 1st, 1971, until December
31st, 1971. Then they were extended until the end of 1972. Now,
they are again extended until the end of 1973.
3
This limitation concerns the so-called sensitive goods and - but
not automatically as in the case of sensitive goods - the so-
called quasi-sensitive products.
It should be mentioned here, that there is no generally accepted
measure by which LDC's can be identified.
In 1973» the preferences are extended to Cuba. See the Country
Lists in the Official Gazette of the EEC, 1972, No. L 296,
p.13,61,81,90,104, 109 and 115.
Although again primarily for political reasons, on the other
hand, Yugoslavia is among iiie developing countries receiving
preferential treatment by the EECr- 6 -
8. In spite of these limitations, the EEC system of preferences
has been accepted favourably by the LDC's. One limitation seems,
even, to meet the approval of most of them. This is the limitation
on the volume of products, which may be exported under the
regime of customs preferences by one single country. In this
way, part of the preferences are reserved for LDC's which are not
yet principal suppliers of a given product. One can, of course,
argue that the real purpose of this regulation is to limit the
imports of these products for protectionist reasons rather than
to give the least developed nations a bigger chance to penetrate
the EEC markets. During the negotiations for preferential treat-
ment of LDC exports, however, the argument of aiding the least
developed partners has also been put forward by the developing
nations themselves.
9. As for the practical results of the EEC preferences, these
measures can be regarded as some success. Although no final
statistics are available, some indications may be found in esti-
mates with regard to the imports into the Federal Republic of
2
Germany. According to these estimates the imports of Germany
under the system of preferences have increased from the second
half of 1971 to the next period observed which is the first half
of the year 1972.
1 UNCTAD Document TD/17 (November 24th, I967): Special Keasures
to be Taken in Favour of the Least Developed Among the Develop-
ing Countries Aimed at Expanding their Trade and Improving their
Economic and Social Development. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat,
p.5' "... where an import market in a developed country is charac-
terized by import quotas allocated on a country-by-country basis,
special consideration in the allocation of such quotas would
be given to the needs of the least developed countries." See
also, p.8. of TD/12 (1st November 1967): "An alternative method
suggested is to reserve for newcomers a certain percentage of
any tariff quota established in order to ensure that the tra-
ditional suppliers do not take up the entire quota. Likewise,
in reviewing from time to time preferential system, it may be
possible to examine the desirability of excluding a particular




Estimates by the Federal Government. "Aktuelle Beitrage zur
Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik" Nr. 128/1972. Bonn, 2.0ktober
1972, p.3.— 7 —
10. The preferential system applied by the EEC has been success-
ful also insofar as it probably induced other western countries
to introduce similar measures. On August 1st, 1971» Japan followed
with the introduction of a system of preferences in favour of
the LDC's. The next country to do this was Norway on 1st October
1971» The United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Eire followed on
1st January 1972, Switzerland on 1st March, 1972, and Austria
on 1st April 1972.
11. In view of the importance the developing countries attach
to them, it is to be expected that the preferences will be per-
manent. They can now be considered as a new element of that system,
just as non-reciprocity with regard to LDC's became one during
the sixties.
12. Another question is what form a general system of preferences
will finally take. It does not have such an easy answer as the re-
ciprocity question had. Simply complying with the LDC's official
demand for full duty-free treatment of all LDC exports to all
industrialized nations would not satisfy, the expectations of all
LDC's, even if the western nations were willing to disregard the
protests from those groups in their economies likely to be struck
by unlimited LDC exports. The aim to further the economic develop-
ment of the LDC's is not served by the abolishment of customs
duties with respect to these countries alone. In addition to trade
creating effects, trade diversion in favour of the LDC's may also
be helpful.
13. Such "aid by 'discrimination" , however, can only be effective
if it puts serious disadvantages in the way of the exports of all
The representative of Brazil stressed this aspect when he stated
"that the scheme of preferences would allow the developing
countries to capture a greater share of world markets, prima-
rily through a process of trade diversion." UNCTAD Document
TD/B/300 - TD/B/AC.5/29 (27.April 1970): Report of the Special
Committee on preferences, para. 135 Emphasis added.- 8 -
those countries which do not qualify as poor. This presupposes,
incidently that disadvantages of this kind, i.e. customs and other
trade barriers, are generally maintained which is not at all un-
likely. Since a future world of unlimited free trade has no great
chance of becoming realised, one has to reckon with the existence
of trade barriers. At least one favourable side effect may result:
trade barriers can be used to serve the desirable purpose of aid-
ing the development of poor nations by discriminating in their
favour.
14. A beginning in this direction has been made by the EEC, other
countries have followed and more, including the United States,
will probably follow. So we can conclude this section with the
statement that preferences in favour of the LDC's have now be-
come an accepted instrument of trade policy and development aid
policy. At present it is rather crude and leaves much to be de-
sired, but it can - and probably will - be improved by lowering
the protectionist safeguards it still contains.
It should be noted, however, that the member states of the OECD
wanted to make it "crystal clear" that the special tariff treat-
ment ... would not be allowed to stand in the way of most-fav-
oured nation tariff reductions if developed countries wished to
introduce them either unilaterally or after another round of
international tariff negotiations." UNCTAD Document TD 56 (29th
January, 1968): Expansion and Diversification of Exports of
Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures of Developing Countries. Pre-
ferential or Free Entry of Exports of Manufactures and Semi-
Manuf actures of Developing Countries to the Developed Countries.
Report of the Special Group of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on Trade with Developing
Countries._ 9 -
III.
15. The deminishing importance of the principle of reciprocity
and the advent of customs preferences, both of tvrhich favour the
developing nations, are accompanied by a further "exception" to
one of the principles of international trade. This is regionalism,
which has to do, again, with the preferential treatment of some
trading partners, i.e. the other members of the regional economic
grouping. In this case, the justification for preferences - or
discriminations, on the other hand - does not lie in the desire
to ease the economic development of the Third World. It lies,
economically, in the conviction that regional economic integration,
under certain conditions, furthers the exchange of goods and
services, the international division of labour and, at least in
the long run, international welfare. The legal justification is
to be found in Article XXIV of the GATT, which sanctions the crea-
tion of customs unions and free trade areas, again under certain
conditions,
16. To be sure, the problem of regionalism is not new, since the
authors of the GATT already took it into account. A new develop-
ment can be seen, however, in the abundance of arrangements which
are justified by Article XXIV GATT. Moreover, Article XXIV GATT
seems to be used more and more to cover arrangements which can
hardly be regarded as customs unions or free trade areas in the
old sense.
17. Rather new is, on the other hand, the vigour with which dubious
arrangements of a preferential kind are attacked. Although, pre-
viously, complaints were heard in this direction, especially from
the USA concerning some associations with the EEC, the contracting
parties "of the GATT not only tolerated customs unions and free
trade areas which did, on the whole, conform with Article XXIV
In the short run, the principal condition is that trade creation
(according to Viner) is greater than trade diversion. In the
longer run, this static concept must be replaced by dynamic con-
siderations .
2
According to Art.XXIV of the GATT the principal condition is that
the trade of the union with so-called third countries meets no
higher obstacles than did the trade of the individual countries
combined, prior to the creation of the union.
3
The other method available under the GATT, i.e. to ask for a
"I/aiver" under Article XXV, is also applied. See, for example, the
arrangements between the EEC and Spain, and between the EEC and
Israel.cf.GATT, Basic Instruments, 17th Supp.(1970),p.61.- 10 -
GATT,they also only feebly voiced their protests against those
arrangements which did not, apparently, conform.
18. Now, opinions have changed in two different ways. On the one
hand, economic unions of any kind are attacked (even those which
comply'with the rules of GATT) because of their discriminating
character vis-a-vis third countries, i.e. outsiders. On the other
hand, there are member states which almost openly defy GATT rules
and scarcely even bother to pay lip service to them.
19. Consequently, the times in which regional integration was an
exception have passed. In Europe the EEC has reached rather formi -
dable dimensions. The United Kingdom, Denmark and Eire have be-
come members, the other former EFTA countries - with the possible
exception of Finland - associates of the Community. The earlier
associations with Greece, Turkey, Tunesia and Malta and-(he prefe-
rential trade arrangements with Israel, Spain and Algeria have won
new importance with the official formulation of a comprehensive EEC
concept vis-a-vis the Mediterranean Area. The association with
french-speaking Africa - already twice renewed - has grown into a
durable partnership with the Community - which probably will be
extended to African members of the Commonwealth - the East African
Community already being associated with the European Community by
the Treaty of Arusha.
20. The emergence of a Community extending its influence and its
internal preferences from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean no longer
allows regionalism to be regarded as just one exception to the
otherwise dominant principle of most-favoured nation treatment.
Moreover, the process of regional economic integration among de-
veloping countries has become officially sanctioned as a means to
promote the development of the poor nations. And, after a period
2 of experimenting, some of the existing groupings appear to have a
chance of being successful.
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, October 25th to November
6th, 1971. Lima/Peru. MM/77/ll/ll,p.2k.
2
Some of the better known examples are the Latin American Free
Trade Area, the Andean Group, the East African Common Market, The
Central African Economic Union.- 11 -
21. Since simply liberalizing trade between the member states
has always turned out in favour of the economically most developed
of the partners and to be disadvantageous for the poorer ones, the
experiments with free trade areas indicated that this method
alone was unable to bring the desired results of economic inte-
gration between developing nations. Therefore, additional tools
were sought.
22. To redistribute the gains from liberalizing intra-union trade,
the use of common funds has been tried with some success. Another
and perhaps better form of redistribution was found in the method
of financing new enterprises in the more backward member states by
2 means contributed mainly by the more advanced partners. Also,
3
common programmes for the industrialization of the whole union
now no longer seem completely hopeless experiments - although
tiiey are difficult to handle within groupings of nations which are
very sovereignty conscious. Finally, a new and original attempt to
solve these problems is the Andean Group. It was founded by some
members of the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), who felt
that they received no or too small a return from the integration
within the larger Free Trade Area.. The Andean countries , while
remaining members of the LAFTA, formed a closer union in which a
common policy concerning industrialization an
it is hoped, accelerate economic development.
common policy concerning industrialization and investment should,
5
See, for example, the "Distributable Pool" of the East African
Community and the "Solidarity Funds" of the Central African
Customs Union.
2
E.g. the activities of the East African Development Bank.
3
Such as the "Complementary Agreements" of the Latin American
Free Trade Area.
k
Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Equador und Peru.
It cannot be denied, however, that all economic unions, customs
unions and free trade areas now in existence - the European
Community not excluded - are dependant on the "good conduct" of
the member states and are vulnerable to political differences.
In the case of the Andean Group, the political development in one
of the partner states, Chile, may well jeopardize an otherx>rise
hopeful economic enterprise. Phenomena of a similar sort can be
observed elsewhere, such as in East Africa and Central Africa.- 12 -
Zh. In any case, even in economic groupings which are in danger of
stagnation for one reason or other, some preferences for trade
between member states are given. This means, with regard to the
System of International Trade, that the most-favoured nation
principle is not applied within all these groupings, irrespective
of the prospects of their reaching the sometimes very ambitious
aims they have formulated. Regional integration, therefore, even
in an early stage of evolution, involves a departure from the
rule of most-favoured nation treatment on the part of all trading
partners.
25. Considering this observation and taking into account the
abundance of economic groupings of one kind or another, one is
inclined to doubt that the most-favoured nation principle is still
the "rule" and that preferences are the "exception." Such doubts
become still greater if the subject dealt with in Section II is
recalled, i.e. the general non-reciprocal preferences which most
industrialized western states give to the less developed countries,
Taking both "exceptions" together, it can be said that the excep-
tions have become the rule.
26. Under these circumstances it seems more in accordance with
reality to formulate, instead of one rule with many exceptions,
a new set of rules stating that
- the member states of regional economic groupings may grant
each other such preferential treatment as is laid down in the
agreements establishing the regional grouping in question;
- the industrialized countries may grant less developed countries
preferential treatment as notified to the contracting parties
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before putting
into force such preferences;
- all other contracting parties of the GATT are entitled to
aost-favoured nation treatment as laid down in Article I of
the Agreement.jo B
ffi W«ltwirtBchaft K
27• This set of rules may (or indeed, should) be complemented
by a clause on consultation or complaints procedure to safe-
guard against abuse. It would probably be necessary to define
the expression "regional economic grouping". But, at any rate,
narrow definitions which impede the trend towards regionalism would
appear to be useless. Experience has now amply shown that Article
XXIV GATT did not prevent regional arrangements which, in many
ways, contradicted the rules of the General Agreement. The re-
gulation only led to exercises in legal interpretation, if not
to disregard, of the GATT. Does this not mean that it is out of
date and should be brought into line with reality ?
IV.
28. With regard to the third principle of international trade,
liberalization, considerable changes can also be observed. Former-
ly liberalization meant the abolition of quantitative restric-
tions and the reduction of customs tariffs. Now, quantitative
restrictions by the importing country are often replaced by
"voluntary" agreements where the exporting country agrees to
limit exports. Customs duties have lost importance and are bound to j
become still less important at the end of the next GATT round. On
the other hand, some of the newly "discovered" non-tariff barriers
may well prove to be a worthwhile object of liberalization measures j
The lower the duty, the more other barriers to trade make them- !
selves felt. Their relative importance grows too, if some states J
may impose additional non-tariff barriers in order to maintain the I
level of protection which their national industries enjoy.
29• Many measures of economic policy can have the effect of hinder- .
ing international trade. In fact, any measure which helps a parti-
cular industry to do better than before places this industry in a
more favourable competitive situation vis-a-vis its competitors
at home and in other countries. This better competitive position
would, as a rule, enable this industry to win a certain share of- Ik -
the national and international market which was formerly served by
foreign firms. So, some goods, which under the previous conditions
were imported, will now be bought from national suppliers. Some
former imports will no longer be made; they will be "hindered" by
the measure in question.
30. It would, of course, go to far to include every national act
which improves the competitive position of a national industry
against foreign competition into this category. A choice has to be
made, and only those cases where either the primary intention is
to actually restrict imports, or where there is an unjustifiably
restricting side-effect, can be tested with a view to their
qualifying as non-tariff barriers.
31. One kind of measure where there can be no doubt as to its
trade restricting intentions are the open quantitative restric-
tions of imports (and sometimes exports). They are dealt with
extensively in the General Agreement by the typical method applied
in GATT: Article XI declares that "no prohibitions or restrictions
other than duties or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be in-
stituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party."
Following this statement are found the exceptions to the rules whicl
1
in practice, have proved very important. Article XII especially '
allowing "any contracting party, in order to safeguard its ex- 1
ternal financial position and its balance of payments, may restrict
the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported ..."
has up to now justified many quantitative restrictions that have
been applied. Equally safe are quantitative restrictions "necessary •
to the enforcement of governmental measures in the field of
agricultural policy. Finally, the United States is not the only
1 Art .XI GATT- 15 -
nation which can and does cite the so-called grandfather clause
in justification of other restrictions.
32. This, in a nutshell, is the actual state of the international
trade system with regard to quantitative restrictions. No profound
change is in sight - at least as long as the existing international
monetary system, allowing and often forcing a great number of
states to claim balance of payment difficulties in order to
justify restrictions of imports, prevails. Mention must be made,
however, of the numerous successful attempts to avoid the im-
position of quantitative restrictions by means of inducing an
exporting country to "voluntarily" restrict exports of some "sen-
2
sitive" goods.
33. Nothing really new has happened lately in the field of anti-
dumping measures and counterveiling duties, since the Agreement
on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT in I967. This so-
called Anti-dumping Code is in operation to deal with cases of
dumping, i.e. price discrimination by foreign private competitors.
As for price discrimination folloxving government subsidies the
contracting parties are still entitled to neutralize the effect
of the subsidy by means of counterveiling duties according to
Article VI. New is, however, the post-Kennedy Round desire to
find out and to measure the excessive or unnecessarily cumbersome
trade restricting effects of anti-dumping and counterveiling
duty proceedings. This is also the aim with regard to other
non-tariff barriers, mentioned in the General Agreement: such
4 5
as subsidies, especially export subsidies, "internal taxes or
other internal eharges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly, to like domestic products", certain customs valuation
This "grandfather clause" is to be found in the Protocol of Pro-
visional Applications of the GATT which stipulates that Part II
of the Agreement shall be applied "to the fullest extent not in-
consistent with existing legislation. In the case of the US the
19^7 existing legislation still justifies restrictions to protect
a national industry.
2
Such measures have lately been ta ken by the US. They are, however,
no speciality of . the x\restern hemisphere. See, for example, the
"voluntary" agreements of the EEC with some Asian textile expor-
ting countries, such as the agreement between the EEC and Korea, I
EEC Official Gazette, 1971, No. L 55, p.12. '
3 GATT Document L/2812 of 12th July, 1967. '
Art. XVI 1 GATT. j
5 Art.XVI 2 GATT I- 16 -
practices, such as the notorious American-selling-price-system,
charges and documentation requirements which exceed the absolutely
2
necessary.
3^. The search for non-tariff barriers is not confined to the
measures which are dealt with or at least mentioned in the Gene-
ral Agreement. One other group of measures which has attracted
the attention of working parties concerned with non-tariff barri-
ers is that of the so-called technical barriers to trade. Another
field of research is that of government procurement practices
which discriminate against foreign suppliers.
35 • On the whole, although non-tariff barriers have received
increasing attention within the framework of liberalization policy
there is still no universally accepted method to deal with them.
Next year's negotiations may lead to a solution, but, in view of
the complexity of the matter, this would be rather surprising,
and probably the problem of liberalizing trade by lowering non-
tariff barriers will remain a challenge for some time.
V.
Considering all this, one must arrive at the following conclusion
with regard to the basic principles of international trade:
36. Reciprocity is aLready only applied to comparable cases. Less
developed countries are, in this respect, not comparable with
industrialized ones. Redefining reciprocity in a sense that in-
cludes comparability is necessary since the concept will remain,
in a modernized form^ the basis of every international agreement,
as long as agreements are governed by the age-old principle of
do ut des.
1 Art. VUGATT.
2 Art.VIII GATT.37» Host-favoured nation treatment is no longer the rule. Preferen-
ces favouring the developing countries or partner states in re-
gional groupings now prevail. In both cases, equal treatment means
special treatment for special cases. Countries that are economi-
cally less developed are a special case as well as countries which
accept the duties of an economic grouping. Nevertheless, most-
favoured nation treatment is a useful concept with regard to those
countries which are neither less developed nor partners of the
same regional group. This principle - although its application
may become, quantitatively speaking y an exception - should be
retained and enforced where none of the special cases is given.
38. Liberalization, although retaining its importance, has found
some new objects of application. Instead of quantitative restric-
tions of imports "voluntary" agreements to restrict export become
a matter of concern. Non-tariff barriers and no longer customs
duties will probably be the main targets of the next GATT-round
to lower the obstacles to international trade.
39- Liberalization, most-favoured nation treatment and reciprocity
have, in the last years, either changed their direction, their j
importance or their meaning. This development should be openly
recognized. Instead of paying lip-service to outmoded concepts
which are often only maintained by dubious interpretations, the
 !
actual meaning of the basic principles, together with their '
i
limitations, should be applied during the international nego- 1
tiations of the next few years to come.